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Digitally Unknown: Why the Ninth Circuit Should 
Wish to Remain Anonymous in In re Anonymous 
Online Speakers 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Anonymous speech has a long and rich history in the United 
States. For example, the Federalist Papers, drafted by James 
Madison, John Jay, and Alexander Hamilton, were published under 
the pseudonym “Publius.”1 The value of the Federalist Papers to civil 
dialogue is undisputed, and it is likely that they would not have had 
the same effect had the drafters been forced to disclose their 
identities.2 As the Supreme Court has stated, “It is plain that 
anonymity has sometimes been assumed for the most constructive 
purposes.”3 Some of these purposes are to avoid chilling effects on 
freedom of expression4 and to allow an unpopular speaker to speak 
without others prejudging her message.5 Nearly two centuries after 
the Federalist Papers were published, the Supreme Court embodied 
in the First Amendment this long-respected right to speak 
anonymously.6 
The anonymous speech doctrine, as it has come to be known, 
has remained vibrant in the United States—protecting individuals 
from laws that would require them to disclose their identities on 
handbills7 and campaign literature.8 Since the advent of the Internet, 
the anonymous speech doctrine has taken on an increasingly 
prominent role in society because anyone with Internet access can 
 
 1. E. Norman Veasey, What Would Madison Think? The Irony of the Twists and Turns of 
Federalism, 34 DEL. J. CORP. L. 35, 38 (2009). 
 2. See Jay Krasovec, Comment, Cyberspace: The Final Frontier, for Regulation?, 31 
AKRON L. REV. 101, 127 n.116 (1997) (citing the importance of anonymous speech in the 
formation of our country and recognizing that “the ability to speak anonymously often 
provides a safe haven for those who wish to express unpopular views”). 
 3. Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 65 (1960). 
 4. Id. at 64. 
 5. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 342 (1995). 
 6. Talley, 362 U.S. at 65. 
 7. Id. at 60. 
 8. McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 357 (1995). 
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become a town crier or a pamphleteer.9 While this increased access to 
a figurative pulpit ought to be celebrated in the marketplace of ideas, 
anonymous online speech also brings new challenges and problems. 
For example, the ease of access to an audience and the general 
permanence of content posted online create numerous opportunities 
for individuals to act maliciously behind the cloak of Internet 
anonymity. Thus, piercing the cloak of anonymity to identify 
anonymous speakers has been litigated with increasing frequency 
since the advent of the Internet.10 
In early 2011, the Ninth Circuit addressed the conflict of 
anonymous speech in the Internet context in In re Anonymous 
Online Speakers.11 This case presented the issue whether the veil of 
anonymity could be pierced for five speakers’ allegedly defamatory 
statements that were anonymously posted to various blogs.12 In 
resolving this issue, the Ninth Circuit had to decide whether the 
circumstances warranted issuing writs of mandamus either to protect 
the speakers’ identities or to require their disclosure in discovery.13 
While the court ultimately declined to issue either of the writs 
(leaving the district court ruling unaltered),14 the court’s analysis 
raises two key questions. First, does anonymous online speech 
deserve more or less protection than traditional anonymous speech? 
Second, what standard should courts apply to balance the interests of 
disclosing the anonymous defamers’ identities with maintaining the 
First Amendment protections afforded to anonymous speakers? 
This Note argues that the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Anonymous 
Online Speakers answered both of these questions erroneously. First, 
the court suggested that anonymous online speech deserves less 
protection than other anonymous speech because the Internet’s 
speed increases the likelihood that harm or lies will be perpetuated.15 
 
 9. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997). 
 10. See, e.g., Doe I v. Individuals, 561 F. Supp. 2d 249 (D. Conn. 2008); Sony Music 
Entm’t Inc. v. Does 1–40, 326 F. Supp. 2d 556 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); In re Subpoena Duces 
Tecum to Am. Online, Inc., 52 Va. Cir. 26 (2000), rev’d on other grounds, Am. Online v. 
Anonymous Publicly Traded Co., 542 S.E.2d 377 (Va. 2001). 
 11. In re Anonymous Online Speakers, 661 F.3d 1168 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 12. Id. at 1171. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. See id. at 1176 (citing with approval the district court’s recognition that the Internet 
has “great potential for irresponsible, malicious, and harmful communication”). 
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The court’s approach is problematic because it directly cuts against 
Supreme Court precedent suggesting that anonymous online speech 
should not be treated differently than other anonymous speech.16 
Second, despite pointing out the inconsistent standards used by 
other courts, the Ninth Circuit failed to articulate which standard 
should govern whether to disclose an anonymous speaker’s identity 
in pretrial discovery.17 The Ninth Circuit passed up a valuable 
opportunity to resolve some confusion—at least for the courts within 
its jurisdiction—with there being no direct Supreme Court precedent 
and numerous standards used by different courts.  
This Note proceeds as follows. Part II provides the facts and 
procedural history of the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Anonymous 
Online Speakers. Part III summarizes the three main areas of analysis 
in the Ninth Circuit’s opinion. Part IV analyzes two major problems 
with the Ninth Circuit’s decision. It argues that the court should 
have treated anonymous online speech the same as other forms of 
anonymous online speakers’ identities, preferably the prima facie case 
standard. Finally, Part V offers a brief conclusion. 
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Quixtar, a multilevel-marketing business run by independent 
business owners, distributes a variety of products to consumers 
(cosmetics, nutritional supplements, etc.).18 TEAM, LLC, founded 
by two Quixtar independent business owners, provided support 
materials, gave business trainings, and even sold products to 
Quixtar.19 In 2007, problems arose between Quixtar and TEAM, 
resulting in several lawsuits between the two companies.20 In one of 
these lawsuits, Quixtar alleged that TEAM conducted a smear 
campaign against Quixtar in order to encourage Quixtar’s 
independent business owners to leave “and join a competing 
multilevel marketing company affiliated with TEAM.”21 This alleged 
“campaign” consisted of at least five anonymous statements posted 
 
 16. See infra Part IV.A. 
 17. See In re Anonymous Online Speakers, 661 F.3d at 1174–78. 
 18. Id. at 1171–72. 
 19. Id. at 1172. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
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on different blogs.22 These statements formed the basis for Quixtar’s 
claims against TEAM for “tortious interference with existing 
contracts and with advantageous business relations.”23 
The case became interesting, however, when Quixtar deposed 
TEAM’s Online Content Manager, Dickie.24 Dickie refused to 
answer questions about the identity of some of the anonymous 
online speakers.25 After examining the statements made on each 
blog, the district court ordered Dickie to testify about the identity of 
three of the speakers.26 To prevent this testimony, the anonymous 
speakers filed a petition for a writ of mandamus to block the court’s 
order.27 Quixtar opposed the petition and cross-petitioned for a writ 
of mandamus to compel the court to require Dickie to testify about 
the other two speakers.28 
III. THE COURT’S DECISION 
The Ninth Circuit originally ruled on the petition for writ of 
mandamus in July 2010,29 but the court withdrew its opinion and 
issued a new one in January 2011.30 This later opinion denied both 
Quixtar’s and the anonymous speakers’ petitions for writs of 
mandamus, ultimately leaving the district court decision 
untouched.31 The Ninth Circuit’s analysis focused on three major 
elements: (1) general First Amendment doctrine and the various 
levels of protection given to different types of speech;32 (2) how a 
 
 22. Id. The blogs were associated with TEAM, Quixtar, or multilevel marketing in some 
way, such as the “Integrity is TEAM” blog and the “IBO Rebellion” blog (referring to the 
way Quixtar ran its business through “Independent Business Owners”). Id. at 1171–72. 
 23. Id. at 1172. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. In re Anonymous Online Speakers, 611 F.3d 653 (9th Cir. 2010), withdrawn and 
superseded by 661 F.3d 1168 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 30. In re Anonymous Online Speakers, 661 F.3d at 1168. The most substantial 
difference between the withdrawn opinion and the one that superseded it is that in the latter, 
the court explicitly declined to decide if the speech at issue constituted commercial speech. 
Compare In re Anonymous Online Speakers, 611 F.3d at 661, with In re Anonymous Online 
Speakers, 661 F.3d at 1177. 
 31. In re Anonymous Online Speakers, 661 F.3d at 1171. 
 32. Id. at 1172–73. 
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petition for mandamus heightens the standard of review in First 
Amendment contexts;33 and (3) the standard that courts use to 
evaluate whether to allow discovery of anonymous speakers’ 
identities.34 The Ninth Circuit ultimately held that, even if the 
district court had applied the wrong standard in deciding whether to 
allow the speakers’ identities to be discoverable, that error would not 
constitute “clear error” sufficient to issue a writ of mandamus for 
either party.35 
First, the Ninth Circuit summarized First Amendment 
jurisprudence by articulating the contours of various levels of speech 
protection. The court gave due deference to the principle that “an 
author’s decision to remain anonymous, like other decisions 
concerning omissions or additions to the content of a publication, is 
an aspect of the freedom of speech protected by the First 
Amendment.”36 The court also added that “online speech stands on 
the same footing as other speech—there is ‘no basis for qualifying 
the level of First Amendment scrutiny that should be applied’ to 
online speech.”37 The Ninth Circuit used the Supreme Court’s 
language from Reno v. ACLU38 and appeared to follow precedent. 
But the court actually undermined precedent because its application 
to anonymous online speech may strip the speech of much of its 
protection.39 The Ninth Circuit appeared to admit that online speech 
did not deserve as much protection as other anonymous speech 
when it approved the district court’s conclusion that the Internet has 
“great potential for irresponsible, malicious, and harmful 
communication and that particularly in the age of the Internet, the 
speed and power of internet technology makes it difficult for the 
truth to ‘catch up’ to the lie.”40 
 
 
 33. Id. at 1174–75, 1177. 
 34. Id. at 1174–78. 
 35. Id. at 1176–78. 
 36. Id. at 1173 (quoting McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 342 
(1995)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 37. Id. (quoting Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997)). 
 38. Reno, 521 U.S. 844. 
 39. See infra Part IV. 
 40. In re Anonymous Online Speakers, 661 F.3d at 1176 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). This is addressed further infra Part IV.A. 
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The Ninth Circuit also explained that the degree of protection 
that speech receives under the First Amendment varies according to 
the expressive interest at stake.41 The spectrum of protection ranges 
from highly protected (and by implication highly valued) political 
speech, to lesser-protected speech such as commercial speech, and 
finally to unprotected speech such as fighting words and obscenity.42 
While commercial speech, like the speech in this case, might deserve 
less protection, the Ninth Circuit also added that “[t]he specific 
circumstances surrounding the speech serve to give context to the 
balancing exercise.”43 This means that anonymous online speech 
could potentially receive less protection than traditional anonymous 
speech simply because the Internet can magnify the harmful effects 
of defamatory speech. 
Second, the Ninth Circuit addressed the standard for evaluating 
mandamus petitions. In granting a petition for a writ of mandamus, 
the Ninth Circuit employs a multifactor balancing approach,44 
weighing the following five factors: 
(1) whether the petitioner has no other means, such as a direct 
appeal, to obtain the desired relief; (2) whether the petitioner will 
be damaged or prejudiced in any way not correctable on appeal; (3) 
whether the district court’s order is clearly erroneous as a matter of 
law; (4) whether the district court’s order is an oft repeated error or 
manifests a persistent disregard of the federal rules; and (5) whether 
the district court’s order raises new and important problems or 
issues of first impression.45 
Although the court mentioned that each factor is relevant for its 
analysis, the court put special emphasis on the third factor—clear 
error—which is the only prong that can be dispositive.46 This was 
critical to the court’s opinion because the Ninth Circuit ultimately  
 
 
 41. In re Anonymous Online Speakers, 661 F.3d at 1173. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. at 1177. 
 44. The Ninth Circuit first articulated its multi-factor balancing approach to evaluating 
mandamus petitions in Bauman. See Bauman v. U.S. Dist. Court, 557 F.2d 650, 654–55 (9th 
Cir. 1977). 
 45. In re Anonymous Online Speakers, 661 F.3d at 1174 (citing Bauman, 557 F.2d at 
654–55). 
 46. Id. 
BBRANDON.FIN (DO NOT DELETE) 3/20/2012  11:36 AM 
445 Digitally Unknown 
 451 
upheld the district court’s decision after expressly analyzing only the 
clear-error factor.47 
Finally, after determining the broad standard of review for the 
writ-of-mandamus issue, the Ninth Circuit discussed the various 
standards that could be applied to determine whether the identities 
of anonymous speakers should be disclosed in discovery.48 But the 
court ultimately left district courts without clear guidance on which 
test is most appropriate, instead suggesting that a vague balancing 
test should be used. This test weighs the importance of the 
anonymous speech involved (including the nature of the speech) 
against the need for relevant discovery.49 
The court concluded that although the district court may have 
applied the wrong standard to the anonymous speech, its decision 
was not the clear error required to grant a writ of mandamus.50 Thus, 
the court dodged some of the major issues in the case. 
IV. ANALYSIS 
The Ninth Circuit’s decision in In re Anonymous Online Speakers 
shows the difficulty of balancing the interests of disclosing 
anonymous speakers’ identities (so that a lawsuit can be adjudicated) 
with protecting the First Amendment right to anonymous speech. 
While this balancing is inherently difficult, the Ninth Circuit made 
two errors in its analysis. First, the Ninth Circuit undermined 
protections that the Supreme Court had established for anonymous 
online speech by suggesting that online anonymity potentially 
deserves less protection than traditional anonymity. Second, the 
court failed to articulate a clear governing standard to determine 
when a court may order the identity of an anonymous online speaker 
to be revealed. Despite recognizing the existing split among courts, 
the Ninth Circuit avoided taking a side and left the courts within its 
jurisdiction without clear guidance. This Note argues that the court 
should have made it clear that anonymous online speech is protected 
the same as other anonymous speech. The court also should have 
adopted the prima-facie-case standard to determine if disclosure of 
 
 47. Id. at 1177. 
 48. Id. at 1175–76. 
 49. Id. at 1176. 
 50. Id. at 1177. 
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an online speaker’s identity was warranted. Alternatively, the court 
could have enunciated a clear standard to fully delineate where the 
rights of anonymous online speakers lie—thus avoiding the chilling 
effects from a multitude of standards. 
A. The Ninth Circuit Undermined Anonymous-Online-Speech 
Protection 
The Supreme Court in Talley v. California originally articulated 
the First Amendment protection for anonymous speech.51 That case 
involved a city ordinance that prohibited people from distributing 
handbills that did not include the speaker’s name and address.52 In 
striking down the ordinance, the Court reasoned that a new doctrine 
needed to be carved out because “[t]here can be no doubt that such 
an identification requirement would tend to restrict freedom to 
distribute information and thereby freedom of expression.”53 
Arguably, this chilling effect is the primary justification for protecting 
anonymous speech.54 The Court does not want to punish speakers 
who have an unpopular message by forcing them to personally and 
publicly present that message. Granting protection to anonymous 
speech certainly has the potential to grant parties a license to express 
harmful views without fear of retribution. However, the Court has 
decided that the freedom of expression outweighs these concerns.55 
Since Talley, the Supreme Court has consistently protected 
anonymous speech. For example, in McIntyre v. Ohio Elections 
Commission,56 the Court considered a similar situation to Talley. 
Ohio had passed a statute that prohibited people from distributing  
anonymous campaign literature.57 When a person seeking to 
 
 51. Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960). 
 52. Id. at 60–61. 
 53. Id. at 64. 
 54. See Eric M. Freedman, Reconstructing Journalists’ Privilege, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 
1381, 1382 (2008). 
 55. See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 341–42 (1995) (“The 
decision in favor of anonymity may be motivated by fear of economic or official retaliation, by 
concern about social ostracism, or merely by a desire to preserve as much of one’s privacy as 
possible. Whatever the motivation may be, . . . the interest in having anonymous works enter 
the marketplace of ideas unquestionably outweighs any public interest in requiring disclosure 
as a condition of entry.”). 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. at 338 n.8. 
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propagate anonymous speech through unsigned leaflets challenged 
the law, the Supreme Court affirmed the Talley principles by 
extending its holding “beyond the literary realm” to the advocacy of 
political causes.58 The Court justified its holding because anonymity 
“provides a way for a writer who may be personally unpopular to 
ensure that readers will not prejudge her message simply because 
they do not like its proponent.”59 By allowing anonymous speech to 
retain its protection in contexts beyond the traditional literary realm, 
the Court affirmed its commitment to further public dialogue by 
allowing ideas to be presented apart from their speaker. 
As mentioned above, the Supreme Court has noted that there is 
“no basis for qualifying the level of First Amendment scrutiny that 
should be applied to [online speech].”60 However, the Court 
decided that case in the context of regulating pornography on the 
Internet; the case did not involve anonymous speech.61 In actuality, 
the Court has yet to decide a case relating to anonymous online 
speech. However, to further open dialogue and the ongoing vast 
discussion of ideas online,62 the Court should be just as willing to 
protect anonymous online speech as it is to protect traditional 
pamphleteering.63 More people have access to voice their opinions 
and spread their ideas if the Court strays far from any chilling effect 
that anonymous online speech regulation can have. The Internet 
truly offers the opportunity for all speakers to be heard on an equal 
ground, regardless of resources. In contrast, anonymous speech 
through traditional handbilling and pamphleteering lacks the reach 
and general availability that the Internet affords.64 This new medium 
for “town criers” and pamphleteers should be celebrated and 
 
 58. Id. at 342. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997). 
 61. Id. 
 62. See Jane S. Schacter, Digitally Democratizing Congress? Technology and Political 
Accountability, 89 B.U. L. REV. 641 (2009) (discussing the prominence of social media in 
political discussions and campaigns). 
 63. The Court in Reno (early in the Internet’s development) appeared very willing to let 
the Internet welcome a new age of easy access to free speech. See Reno, 521 U.S. at 870 
(“Through the use of chat rooms, any person with a phone line can become a town crier with 
a voice that resonates farther than it could from any soapbox. Through the use of Web pages, 
mail exploders, and newsgroups, the same individual can become a pamphleteer.”). 
 64. See Doe v. 2TheMart.com Inc., 140 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1092 (W.D. Wash. 2001). 
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protected—at least as much as speech in traditional mediums—as a 
way to further freedom of expression.  
The Ninth Circuit implicitly reached the opposite conclusion. 
Although the Ninth Circuit recognized that the Supreme Court has 
stated (albeit in other contexts) that online speech should not be 
treated different from other types of speech, the Ninth Circuit in 
Anonymous Online Speakers simultaneously suggested that online 
speech might deserve less protection. When discussing whether to 
disregard the speakers’ anonymity in this case, the court approvingly 
cited the district court’s evaluation of the value of anonymous online 
speech: 
The district court here appropriately considered the important 
value of anonymous speech balanced against a party’s need for 
relevant discovery in a civil action. It also recognized the “great 
potential for irresponsible, malicious, and harmful communication” 
and that particularly in the age of the Internet, the “speed and 
power of internet technology makes it difficult for the truth to 
‘catch up’ to the lie.”65 
The Ninth Circuit’s reasoning undercuts the rationales for free 
speech doctrines in general, and the purpose for protecting 
anonymous speech in particular. While anonymous online speech is 
certainly subject to abuse, the Supreme Court recognized similar 
potential in Talley and McIntyre when the rule was being developed 
and applied. These harms are balanced out by allowing limited 
disclosure of an anonymous speaker’s identity based on the level of 
proof available that the speaker’s conduct is actionable.66 Ultimately, 
this balancing needs to occur to ensure that anonymous speech has 
enough protection that it will not be chilled by unmasking speakers’ 
identities without sufficient proof of wrongdoing. Further, the 
online nature of speech should not be included in this balancing.67 
 
 65. In re Anonymous Online Speakers, 661 F.3d 1168, 1176 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting 
Quixtar Inc. v. Signature Mgmt. Team, LLC, 566 F. Supp. 2d 1205, 1214 (D. Nev. 2008)). 
 66. See Musetta Durkee, Note, The Truth Can Catch the Lie: The Flawed Understanding 
of Online Speech in In Re Anonymous Online Speakers, 26 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 773, 775 
(2011) (“When faced with discovery requests and subpoenas to unmask anonymous speakers’ 
identities, courts must weigh the harmed parties’ rights to redress against the anonymous 
online speakers’ Constitutional rights of speech.”). The various standards that courts have 
adopted are discussed infra Part IV.B. 
 67. See Durkee, supra note 66, at 776 (“[T]he Ninth Circuit . . . mistakenly 
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In addition to suggesting that online speech has the potential to 
be especially harmful, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that the truth 
might lag behind a lie in the context of anonymous online speech.68 
The court did not attempt to explain why this might be, but the idea 
relates to one of the justifications for protecting free speech: the 
marketplace of ideas.69 The marketplace of ideas posits that society is 
a marketplace where ideas compete for acceptance.70 Some of these 
ideas are true and others are false. Ultimately, the good and true 
ideas will be sorted out from the lies, and truth will prevail.71 The 
Ninth Circuit appears to suggest that when false ideas are propagated 
online, the marketplace of ideas is unable to correct itself because the 
false ideas can travel quickly in cyberspace. While this concern is 
understandable, although not necessarily correct,72 the alternative is 
to blot out the speaker’s opinion from the beginning. It is better to 
accept any potentially undesirable lag in the marketplace of ideas, 
which still functions online, than to censor speakers in the name of 
truth. The Ninth Circuit was incorrect to suggest that the nature of 
online speech, particularly as it relates to the marketplace of ideas, 
should be factored in to deprive anonymous online speakers of 
adequate protection for their ideas.  
As a concluding thought, it is entirely possible that the Ninth 
Circuit did not intend to approvingly cite the district court’s 
reasoning to suggest that online speech is less deserving of 
protection. Hopefully, the Ninth Circuit actually disagreed with the 
reasoning of the district court. However, the Ninth Circuit’s 
language was sufficiently ambiguous that it could still have serious 
chilling effects on anonymous online speech. If the Ninth Circuit 
disagreed with the decision of the district court, the court easily 
 
characterized the online nature of the defendant’s speech as a separate factor in the . . . 
balancing test, finding that the allegedly harmful speech occurred on the Internet inherently 
weighed against the anonymous speaker.”). 
 68. In re Anonymous Online Speakers, 661 F.3d at 1176. 
 69. Cf. Maurice E. Stucke & Allen P. Grunes, Antitrust and the Marketplace of Ideas, 69 
ANTITRUST L.J. 249, 249 (2001). 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. See MADELEINE SCHACHTER & JOEL LAURENCE KURTZBERG, LAW OF INTERNET 
SPEECH 454 (3d ed. 2008) (“[T]he recipients of [offensive online] statements do not 
necessarily attribute the same level of credence to the statements that they would accord to 
statements made in other contexts.”). 
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could have made clear that the district court was incorrect. Also, the 
court could have chosen not to restate the district court’s reasoning. 
Instead, by quoting the district court’s reasoning without additional 
commentary and by upholding the district court’s decision, the 
Ninth Circuit appeared to approve and perpetuate the district court’s 
flawed reasoning, which undermines protections given to 
anonymous online speech. 
B. Chilling Standards for Anonymous Online Speech 
One of the keys to making our laws effective is to give them a 
semblance of consistency that will allow individuals to confidently 
order their behavior around those laws.73 In the First Amendment 
context, consistent laws are especially important to ensure that 
protected speech is not “chilled,” as when people overly restrict their 
own expression to ensure they will not be punished. The Supreme 
Court has gone to great lengths to establish this principle.74 The 
Court has generally adopted flexible balancing tests over bright-line 
rules in the First Amendment context to ensure that the law does not 
unintentionally silence protected speech; this approach allows the 
free speech doctrine to grow and change as society needs.75 But 
courts that have applied these principles in the anonymous speech 
context have gone on to adopt a number of different approaches that 
are far from consistent and only as flexible as the individual judge’s 
policy preferences permit. 
In In re Anonymous Online Speakers, the Ninth Circuit 
considered the state of the law in various jurisdictions before 
announcing the standard it would use to determine whether interests 
in discovering a speaker’s identity outweighed that speaker’s 
 
 73. Kaimipono David Wenger, Reparations Within the Rule of Law, 29 T. JEFFERSON L. 
REV. 231, 242 (2007) (extolling the benefits of the rule of law). 
 74. See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340–41 (1974) (relating that 
speech restrictions must clear certain requirements so that protected speech will not be self-
censored). 
 75. See, e.g., Terry Nicole Steinberg, Rival Union Access to Public Employees: A New First 
Amendment Balancing Test, 2 GEO. MASON L. REV. 361, 361 (1994) (discussing the Court’s 
balancing test to reconcile the “tensions between the First Amendment and labor relations in 
the public sector”); Anthony N. Moshirnia, Note, The Pickering Paper Shield: The Erosion of 
Public School Teachers’ First Amendment Rights Jeopardizes the Quality of Public Education, 16 
B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 313, 320 (2007) (discussing the Court’s Pickering balancing test for public 
employees’ First Amendment rights to free expression). 
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anonymous speech interests.76 This section shows the confusion 
resulting from the various standards that courts have used. Despite 
recognizing this split in opinion among courts, the Ninth Circuit 
failed to adopt one of the standards to clear up some confusion. 
As the Ninth Circuit pointed out, the least-protective courts have 
declined to create or adopt a new standard for anonymous online 
speech. Instead, they have used only traditional state discovery rules 
to determine whether anonymous speakers’ identities should be 
disclosed.77 The virtue of taking this approach is that it minimizes 
the number of potentially applicable standards (and possible 
confusion) in an anonymous speech case, and arguably, traditional 
discovery rules could protect the same interests.78 However, 
anonymous speech is of such importance that it deserves separate 
protection and a consistent standard to protect it. Allowing each 
state’s discovery rules to govern the disclosure of anonymous 
speakers’ identities could create so many different standards that 
speech could be chilled out of fear that another state’s laws might 
leave the anonymous utterance unprotected. 
The next step up from no separate protection is to evaluate the 
speech and discovery interests under the “motion to dismiss or good 
faith standard.”79 While this standard may be clearer than developing 
a new standard, its low bar for protecting the identities of 
anonymous online speakers presents a significant risk of chilling 
anonymous speech. Although the anonymous speaker will retain the 
opportunity to challenge the lawsuit on its merits and may still 
prevail on freedom of expression grounds, disclosing the speaker’s 
identity to her accusers results in irreversible damage. Thus, a 
standard set so low would invite frivolous litigation designed solely 
to discover the identities of anonymous speakers. 
 
 
 76. In re Anonymous Online Speakers, 661 F.3d at 1176. 
 77. Id. at 1175 (citing Klehr Harrison Harvey Branzburg & Ellers, LLP v. JPA Dev., 
Inc., No. 0425, 2006 WL 37020, at *8 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. Jan. 4, 2006)). 
 78. See Michael S. Vogel, Unmasking “John Doe” Defendants: The Case Against Excessive 
Hand-Wringing over Legal Standards, 83 OR. L. REV. 795, 801 (2004). 
 79. In re Anonymous Online Speakers, 661 F.3d at 1175 (citing Columbia Ins. Co. v. 
seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. 573 (N.D. Cal. 1999); see also In re Subpoena Duces Tecum to 
Am. Online, Inc., 52 Va. Cir. 26 (2000), rev’d on other grounds, Am. Online v. Anonymous 
Publicly Traded Co., 542 S.E.2d 377 (Va. 2001)). 
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Some courts have adopted a standard that is higher than the 
motion-to-dismiss standard but lower than the prima-facie-case 
standard.80 Although this exact standard avoids clear classification 
and arguably provides more protection than the motion-to-dismiss 
standard, a lack of guidelines makes this standard somewhat arbitrary 
and unable to adequately protect anonymous speakers’ rights. 
The next clear standard appears to be the prima-facie-case 
standard.81 Under this approach, the plaintiff must make out a 
“prima facie showing of the claim for which the plaintiff seeks the 
disclosure of the anonymous speaker’s identity.”82 This standard is 
adequate to protect anonymous online speech and is the standard 
that the Ninth Circuit should have adopted for cases that do not 
involve political speech. The prima-facie-case standard requires 
sufficient evidence of wrongdoing to support a cause of action but 
also does not require as much evidence as a motion for summary 
judgment. By using the prima-facie-case standard appropriately, the 
court can balance the interests in free expression against the need to 
discover online speakers’ identities. The court does so with the 
balance in favor of the anonymous speaker but without being too 
exacting to allow truly defamatory speech to go unpunished. 
Finally, the standard that the district court in Quixtar Inc. v. 
Signature Management Team, LLC adopted is the most exacting 
standard that courts have applied.83 This standard, established by the 
Delaware Supreme Court in Doe v. Cahill,84 “requires plaintiffs to be 
able to survive a hypothetical motion for summary judgment and 
give, or attempt to give, notice to the speaker before discovering the 
anonymous speaker’s identity.”85 Requiring such a high standard 
merely to obtain the identity of an opposing party may seem 
excessive; however, the Ninth Circuit was quick to point out that 
 
 80. In re Anonymous Online Speakers, 661 F.3d at 1176 (citing Sedersten v. Taylor, 
No. 09-3031-CV-S-GAF, 2009 WL 4802567 (W.D. Mo. Dec. 9, 2009); Enterline v. Pocono 
Med. Ctr., 751 F. Supp. 2d 782 (M.D. Pa. 2008); Doe v. 2TheMart.com Inc., 140 F. Supp. 
2d 1088 (W.D. Wash. 2001)). 
 81. Id. at 1175. 
 82. Id. (citing Doe I v. Individuals, 561 F. Supp. 2d 249 (D. Conn. 2008); Highfields 
Capital Mgmt., LP v. Doe, 385 F. Supp. 2d 969 (N.D. Cal. 2005); Sony Music Entm’t, Inc. 
v. Does 1–40, 326 F. Supp. 2d 556 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)). 
 83. Id. 
 84. Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451 (Del. 2005). 
 85. In re Anonymous Online Speakers, 661 F.3d at 1176. 
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such an exacting standard was justified in Cahill because political 
speech (which receives increased First Amendment protection) was at 
issue in that case.86 Additionally, because the Supreme Court has 
already accepted that the anonymous speech doctrine leaves some 
misbehavior unpunished, this high standard is appropriate when the 
speech’s value is especially high, such as it is with political speech. 
However, to require such a strong showing in other situations would 
overbalance free speech interests against the legitimate need for 
disclosure. 
Evaluating each of these standards separately demonstrates that 
each has significant weaknesses in its application. However, given the 
nature of the speech at issue in this case, the Ninth Circuit should 
have adopted the prima-facie-case standard because it best balances 
the importance of anonymous online speech against the lesser 
interest in disclosure.  
Rather than adopt the prima-facie-case standard, the Ninth 
Circuit made the mistake of not adopting any standard at all. Even 
conclusively adopting a lesser standard would have been preferred 
because it would have provided more protection than the current 
hodgepodge of standards. Allowing judges the discretion to choose 
between competing standards only exacerbates the problem. A judge 
who favors full civil discovery, or one who is critical of the potentially 
malicious nature of anonymous online speech, will tend to choose a 
lesser standard. When individuals do not know what standard will 
apply to their anonymous online speech, they will not know where 
their First Amendment protections lie. As such, speakers who are 
conscious of the law might stay far from the dividing line of 
protected and unprotected speech, which has the potential to chill 
fully protected speech. This harm can be corrected only by 
announcing a single standard to decide when anonymous online 
speakers’ identities will be protected. The Ninth Circuit passed up a 
good opportunity to be the first circuit court to announce a solid 
standard on this issue. Instead, the Ninth Circuit has advanced the 
confusion and virtually ensured that this problem will remain until 
the Supreme Court can conclusively resolve it.  
 
 86. Id. at 1176–77. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Anonymous speech has been a historically protected right under 
the First Amendment. It has been justified as a way to avoid 
potential chilling effects on freedom of expression and a way to allow 
unpopular speakers to speak without having others prejudge their 
message based on who they are. The Internet has increased the use 
and value of anonymous speech by allowing all people the 
opportunity to speak their minds without disclosing their identities. 
With this expansion in online speech, modern courts have been left 
with the challenge to balance the need for disclosure of anonymous 
speakers’ identities against the chilling effect that such disclosure has. 
Courts have attempted to tackle these problems but have created 
a hodgepodge of inconsistent standards that have a distinct chilling 
effect beyond what a single standard would necessarily provide. The 
Ninth Circuit’s recent opinion in In re Anonymous Online Speakers 
has only added to the confusion. Rather than extend Supreme Court 
precedent to grant equal protection to anonymous speech both 
online and offline, the Ninth Circuit has suggested that anonymous 
online speech may be less deserving of protection. If not contrary to 
the Supreme Court’s command, the Ninth Circuit’s decision is 
certainly contrary to the policies underlying the First Amendment 
and the anonymous speech doctrine.  
Further, the Ninth Circuit has failed to announce a workable 
solution to balance anonymous speech interests against interests in 
disclosing speaker identity. The Ninth Circuit should have adopted 
the prima-facie-case standard, which provides a good balance but still 
favors protecting anonymous online speech. Rather, the Ninth 
Circuit’s opinion has given little guidance to district courts. Each 
court may create its own standards, based upon its judge’s personal 
preferences, awaiting eventual Supreme Court intervention to 
provide a clear standard. Overall, the Ninth Circuit’s opinion has 
greatly added to the chilling effects that encumber this area of First 
Amendment law. 
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